Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract: "Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if taxpayers face undue pressure from collectors. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan into one of three performance-pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivised units had 9.3 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46 percent higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.8 log points (62 percent higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. Further analysis reveals that these revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivised areas in fact pay no more taxes, but do report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collector's bargaining power over taxpayers, who either have to pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed, or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down."
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
|
|
Science
|
American Economic Association
|
Health Affairs
|
Ideas for India
|
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
|
Harvard Kennedy School of Government
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
Nature
|
Penguin Random House
|
PNAS
|
Ideas for India
|
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
|
|
EconPapers
|
J-PAL
|
American Economic Journal
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
Nature
|
Seuil Jeunesse
|
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
|
EconPapers
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
Juggernaut Books
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
J-PAL
|
New England Journal of Medicine AI
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
Journal of Development Economics
|
Hachette
|
American Economic Association
|
De Gruyter
|
Oxford University Press
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
EconPapers
|
Public Affair Books
|
Seuil
|
Seuil
|
J-PAL
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
The MIT Press
|
National Bureau of Economic Research
|
VoxDev
|
MIT Climate Grand Challenges