Tax farming redux: Experimental evidence on performance pay for tax collectors
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National Bureau of Economic Research
Research
From the abstract: "Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists' ability to measure corruption. This in turn has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption? We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory but also that the effects of anticorruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents."
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Science
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American Economic Association
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Health Affairs
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Ideas for India
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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Harvard Kennedy School of Government
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Nature
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Penguin Random House
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PNAS
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Ideas for India
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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IZA Institute of Labor Economics
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EconPapers
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J-PAL
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American Economic Journal
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Nature
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Seuil Jeunesse
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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EconPapers
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Juggernaut Books
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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J-PAL
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New England Journal of Medicine AI
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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Journal of Development Economics
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Hachette
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American Economic Association
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De Gruyter
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Oxford University Press
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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EconPapers
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Public Affair Books
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Seuil
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Seuil
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J-PAL
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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The MIT Press
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National Bureau of Economic Research
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VoxDev
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MIT Climate Grand Challenges